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 Voting behavior in a city of poor workers and rich entrepreneurs: Local contextual effects 
and class voting in the Mexico City metropolitan area, 1994-2000 
 
Introduction 
One of the questions of voting behavior is whether urban voters vote in a local contextual 
and/or social class vacuum. Social classes are distinct from local contextual effects in terms of 
voter tendencies. If voters vote depending on either of the two or both contexts, then how much 
does each one affect voting results? Our analysis of the 1994 and 2000 presidential elections in 
the metropolitan area of Mexico City (MCMA) supports the hypothesis that both the local 
context and the social class matter. Nevertheless, political scientists seem to be right in that the 
importance of the local context is considerably less when the socioeconomic composition of the 
population has been included in the explanatory models (King, 1996; McAllister and Studlar, 
1992). Still, in this paper we find evidence to support geographers’ argument that place matters 
too (Johnston et al, 1988).  
The debate between local context and composition effects among political scientists and 
geographers is not over and it remains important for two reasons. First, it is far from over since 
the issue is connected to the idea that some researchers hold which is that social class actually 
does not determine electoral behavior. Second, it is consequential in countries like Mexico where 
free, multiparty competition is new, fierce, and ultimately luxurious both for rich and poor 
taxpayers.
1 Not to mention that political and social theories of democratic developed countries 
might not apply.  
These theoretical arguments are based on research findings which seem to depend on 
what country the data or researcher are from.
2  For data from developed democracies, most 
researchers consider social classes are dissolving (Franklin et al, 1992; Pakulski and Waters, 
1996), thus it is not reasonable to think of class voting in such societies (Michal and Asher, 
1999). Yet a few find social class to determine electoral behavior spanning from importantly 
(Miyano, 1998) to less important (Andersen and Heath, 2000, p. 3).  
Based on data from developing, or new, to multiparty competition countries, evidence 
largely supports the argument that social classes are visible and class-consciousness substantially 
                                                           
1 Election expenses are publicly funded. The 2000 elections cost sixty thousand million pesos; around six billion 
USD. This is three times the yearly science and technology budget of Mexico. Source: Newspaper La Jornada, July 
16, 2006.  
2 It seems that there are spatial variations in the arguments. 
Manuscript (without title page)  1 
determines individual electoral behavior (Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Cigehn, 1999; 
Domanski, 1999; Rehakova, 1999; Ozcan, 1998; Roberts, 1995). 
Social class divisions are easily visible in Mexico City and it would be hypocritical to 
argue (<dispute) these have fallen in importance -as it is argued for developed countries. The 
MCMA, as most Latin American major urban areas, shows sharp social contrasts and spatial 
segregation patterns (Vilalta, 2007).
3 Wealthy areas are located mostly in the south and west of 
the city, whereas the poorest areas stretch out from the center for kilometers to the north and to 
the east. Also, the political weight of the MCMA is phenomenal. Eighteen percent of the 
country’s electorate lives here. For the 2000 elections, the MCMA had almost 11 million voters. 
Due to the previous unfinished theoretical disputes and their political and social 
implications, this investigation attempts to contribute to the debate by separating and measuring 
the relationship between contextual effects and social class. In this way we intend to demonstrate 
the explanatory capabilities and theoretical interrelations between context and class –geography 
and social composition. 
This paper is divided into four parts. The first part presents a review of previous studies 
on class voting and local contextual effects in electoral behavior. The second part presents the 
methods and data utilized in this study. The third part is an explanation of the results of the 
analysis which emphasizes the measurement of local context and class voting effects, both 
independently and altogether. The fourth part consists of a discussion of the results and a 
conclusion of the study overall.  
 
1.  Previous studies on class voting and local contextual effects 
 
The good news is that since the mid eighties studies of electoral behavior or voting 
results in Mexico have multiplied in number and sophistication. The not-too-good news is that 
the study of the urban electorate has been largely neglected despite its importance for explaining 
the rise of political opposition and modern multiparty competition in Mexico (Vilalta, 2004).  
Most of the few studies that have attended urban voters focus on the Federal District (FD) 
                                                           
3 The Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA) is one of the largest metropolitan areas in the world with a population of almost 
19 million inhabitants. It is divided into the Federal District (FD) and the Conurbated Area (CA) of the State of Mexico (see map 
1). Economically, MCMA dominates industry and commerce in the country (34% of the national GDP).    2 
electorate; whereas other cities and the suburban electorate in the conurbated area (CA) of the 
MCMA remain mostly unstudied. The reasons for this neglect are unknown. 
 
Map 1 
Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA) 
 
* Note: The MCMA is composed of 56 municipalities; 39 municipalities  
belong to the state of Mexico, 1 to the state of Hidalgo, and 16 to the Federal  
District. In dark blue is FD. 
 
Concisely, these FD studies show evidence of four main features of the Mexican urban 
electorate. The first and largest set of studies are those that prove the positive effects of political 
reforms on voting turnout and the expansion of electoral preferences (Davis and Coleman, 1982; 
Miron, 1998; Molinar and Weldon, 1990; Peschard 1988b).
4 The second larger set of studies 
emphasizes the importance of political culture variables to explain the changes in electoral 
behavior (Alvarez, 1998; Crespo, 1996; Peschard, 1997). Third is the literature on rational voter 
theory and the increasingly importance of loose voters who seem to be defining electoral swings 
(Estrada, 2006; Pacheco et al, 2006, Gomez, 2000). Fourth and final, there are a small number of 
                                                           
4 This finding would probably apply not only to voters in Mexico City but to voters in other urban areas in Mexico.   3 
studies dealing with clientelism practices between candidates and voters in large housing 
complexes and city public works referendums ( Tejera, 2000; Vilalta, 2007). 
Class voting could not exist without class politics. A classic study on class politics is 
Ward's (1990) analysis of the urban structure and the politics of Mexico City. This study 
acknowledges the FD as a class polarized society where the old local administration was a 
machine designed for the management of social unrest and the maintenance of the status quo.
5 
Another important study of class politics in the FD is Diane Davis' (1994) analysis on political 
conflict and urban development. She carefully documented the historically grounded conflicts 
and alliances in Mexico City among the state and what she defined as class actors. Good 
examples of current class policies are the pension system for elderly residents, local subsidies to 
keep milk accessible to lower income families, and the public high school system that only 
attends to students residing in the poorest areas of the FD (Cervantes and Vilalta, 2007). 
In addition to the previous studies there are also other Mexican analyses based on survey 
and/or geographically aggregated data, with findings testable to all urban and/or FD voters. Here 
there seems to be four kinds of studies and findings. First, there is the oldest and largest set of 
studies which have demonstrated the strong correlation of social class with voting results (Ames, 
1970; Klesner, 1993, 1997 and 1998; Molinar and Weldon, 1990). Second, there is a set of 
studies that report another strong correlation between increasing levels of voting turnout with 
multiparty competition (Klesner, 1987; Molinar and Valdes, 1987). Third, is the finding of a 
progressive trend in the formation of partisan cleavages (Dominguez and McCann, 1995). Fourth 
and newest, is the rising attention put on political issues and candidates appealing for voters 
(Moreno and Yanner, 2000; Moreno, 2003) which is clearly due to the influence of American 
methodological fashions on Mexican academia –i.e. the spatial modeling of voting behavior. 
How is class voting related to electoral preferences in Mexico? Mexican literature shows 
voting results to be correlated with the following conventional social class variables: income, 
education, and occupation. Firstly, in terms of income, it has been found that lower income 
people favor the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and Partido de la Revolución 
Democratica (PRD), whereas upper income people favor Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) 
(Klesner, 1987, 1998; Ramos, 1985; Reyna, 1971; Tarres, 1996; Vilalta, 2004 and 2006). Higher 
levels of education indicate the propensity to vote for the PAN while it decreases the preference 
                                                           
5  Precisely, a particular concern is that increasing social polarization and unrest might lead to violent behavior   4 
for the PRI (Klesner, 1993 and 1998; Peschard, 1997; Vilalta, 2004 and 2006). This variable is 
said to have a positive effect on the PRD too (Dominguez and McCann, 1995; Klesner, 1998). 
Occupation has been used as a proxy for social class in Mexico. In this respect, it has been found 
that bureaucrats have supported the PRI (Dominguez and McCann, 1995; Reyna, 1971), while 
the unemployed have tended to support the PRD (Klesner, 1998). On the other hand, people in 
managerial and other jobs not related to agriculture, as well as regions with large proportions of 
manufacturing jobs, have had a preference for non-PRI parties (Reyna, 1971; Vilalta, 2006).  
So while class voting is a sociological construct somewhat developed in the Mexican 
voting behavior literature, a feature totally missing in Mexican electoral studies is the 
relationship between class and voting results in the context of large metropolitan areas. In fact, 
our review of international refereed literature shows almost no studies attempting to answer 
obvious question of whether urban voters differ from one another in different cities (Vilalta, 
2004). Neither is the interest in knowing if urban voters differ from national trends in their 
opinions or local contexts are actually important enough as to influence voters (Agnew, 1987).  
But what is the local context? A good and very popular definition is "the environment in 
which political behavior is shaped and expressed" (O'Loughlin, 2002, p. 4). The logic here is that 
local environments have an effect on political attitudes and behaviors via "social networks, 
sources of information and reference to groups rooted in places" (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999, 
p. 87). The consequence on voting behavior is that people in similar socioeconomic 
circumstances may vote differently depending on where they live; i.e. their location. 
This idea of local contextual effects in political behavior is neither new nor unpopular 
among social scientists (Agnew, 1987; Burbank, 1995; Cox, 1969; Flint, 1995; Fotheringham, 
1998; Johnston et al, 1990; Johnston, 1991; O'Louhglin and Anselin, 1991). Some clear 
examples of contextual effects in voting behavior in the scientific literature are (1) the public 
perception of the national economy (Pattie et al, 1997), (2) the performance of parties in local 
election campaigning (Forrest et al, 1999), and (3) the spatial variation in economic prosperity 
which leads to different political behaviors (Cox, 1987; Pattie et al, 1995).  
This “local context” perspective in political behavior has been applied to the urban 
electorate. For instance, in the U.S. there is a small and valuable set of studies that contend that 
the urban context -and even the location of the voter within an urban or metropolitan area- 
affects electoral preferences (Dreier et al, 2004; Gainsborough, 2005; Mollenkopf and   5 
Swanstrom, 1999); i.e. the urban context has some sort of "political transformative effects" on 
voters (Sauerzopf and Swanstrom, 1999; p 88). 
After putting together all these ideas into the study of the Mexican urban electorate, some 
preliminary –even rudimentary- evidence of such “political transformative effects” can be 
observed in the MCMA when voting results are disaggregated by urban vs. suburban votes (see 
table 1). Also, differing trends between national and the MCMA voters may be observed from 
results in table 2. 
 
Table 1. Percentage of the total vote for each party in the 1994 and 2000  
presidential elections within the MCMA* 
 1994  2000  ∆∆∆∆  1994 - 2000 
PAN      
Federal District (FD)  26.1%  42.5%  16.4% 
Conurbated Area (CA)  28.0%  43.1%  15.0% 
PRI      
Federal District (FD)  42.1%  24.4%  -17.7% 
Conurbated Area (CA)  44.9%  31.6%  -13.3% 
PRD      
Federal District (FD)  21.3%  26.8%  5.5% 
Conurbated Area (CA)  18.6%  19.7%  1.1% 
Data source: Federal Electoral Institute, Mexico. Author´s own calculations. 
* For the 2000 elections, PAN became Alianza por el Cambio; Coalition of Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) and 
Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico (PVEM). PRD became Alianza por Mexico: Coalition of Partido de la 
Revolucion Democratica (PRD), Partido del Trabajo (PT), Convergencia, Partido de la Sociedad Nacionalista 
(PSN), and Partido Accion Social (PAS). The three latter parties were created just before the 2000 elections. The 
PRI competed on its own. 
 
Table 2. Percentage of the total vote for each party in the 1994 and 2000  
presidential elections in the MCMA and nationally* 
 1994  2000  ∆∆∆∆  1994 - 2000 
PAN      
MCMA 27.5%  43.0%  15.5% 
National 25.8%  42.5%  16.7% 
PRI      
MCMA 44.1%  29.5%  -14.6% 
National 48.7%  36.1%  -12.6% 
PRD      
MCMA 19.3%  21.7%  2.3% 
National 5.9%  16.6%  10.7% 
Data source: Federal Electoral Institute, Mexico. Authors calculations. 
* For the 2000 elections, PAN became Alianza por el Cambio; Coalition of Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) and 
Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico (PVEM). PRD became Alianza por Mexico: Coalition of Partido de la 
Revolucion Democratica (PRD), Partido del Trabajo (PT), Convergencia, Partido de la Sociedad Nacionalista 
(PSN), and Partido Accion Social (PAS). The three latter parties were created just before the 2000 elections. The 
PRI competed on its own. 
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Since we attempt to contribute to the specialized literature by clearly separating and 
measuring the relationship between local context and social class with electoral results, it is 
necessary to conduct inferential tests on these data. In the following section we detail the 
methods and data used for this study. 
 
2.  Methods and data 
The Mexican studies previously commented have made use of both qualitative and 
quantitative research. Nevertheless, this literature shows no major disagreement in terms of 
findings. In other words, it seems methods have not determined the results. Among the 
quantitative studies, descriptive statistics have been the norm and perhaps the goal; the few 
inferential techniques utilized have been correlation and linear regression.  
A few Mexican electoral studies have tested for contextual effects, sometimes called 
spatial effects with the use of spatial statistics (Fernández-Durán, Poiré y Rojas-Nandayapa, 
2004; Vilalta, 2004 and 2006).
6  In these studies it has been found that the local context is 
important for voters and for parties; specifically, the presence of urban clusters of electoral 
preferences, and the changing spatial patterns and temporality of electoral results (Vilalta, 2004 
and 2006).  
Spatial concentration was measured in this study using Moran’s spatial autocorrelation 
coefficients (Moran, 1950). After a non-random pattern of spatial concentration of electoral 
results was found for all parties, spatial autoregressive modeling (SAM) was used to calculate 
the magnitude and significance of the relationships between socioeconomic covariates and 
electoral results. A Moran test was also conducted on the regression residuals, and spatial effects 
were calculated as well.
7 Naturally, included in this analysis is a “t” test comparing the electoral 
results of the two locations –contexts- where all MCMA voters reside: the federal district or the 
conurbated area. 
Prior to the selection of the social class variables, we selected the variables that had 
consistently reported significance in previous studies and searched for the most compact model 
                                                           
6 The statistical implications of spatial data analysis have been commented extensively in other works; see Anselin, 
1988. 
7 OLS modeling was utilized to check for the variance inflation factor (VIF) and to conduct a Durbin Watson test on 
the residuals. In all cases, the models utilized showed to be free of residual and nonlinearity problems.   7 
with the smallest residual standard errors for the 2000 elections. We kept a measure of income, 
education and housing conditions.
8 The variables are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Dependent and independent variables in the analysis* 
Dependent variable  Description 
Voting Results  % Vote for each party (PAN, PRD, PRI) in the 1994 and 2000 presidential 
elections 








Local contextual effects: 
Local context 
Spatial effects (Rho) 
 
% of occupied population that earn > 10 daily minimum wages (1995 and 
2000) 
% of population aged > 15 yrs. with less than 6 years of school education  
(1995 and 2000) 
% of housing units with drainage and access to electricity (1995 and 2000) 
 
Dummy variable for two contexts: Federal District (FD) and Conurbated 
Area (CA) 
Spatial lag of the DV (1994 and 2000) 
* Data Sources: The electoral data analyzed in this work are available from the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) website. The 
socioeconomic data is Conteo 1995 and Census 2000 and are also are available from the National Institute of Statistics, 
Geography and Informatics (INEGI) website in Mexico. 
 
Six separate SAM equations—one for each party in the two elections were calculated. 
Local contextual effects were considered expressly via a dummy variable indicating the location 
of each municipality either in the FD or the CA. Spatial effects were intended to be detected with 
the rho coefficient included in the equation. The rho coefficient is the average of the dependent 
variable in the neighboring areas. This coefficient is directed to measure the spatial 
autocorrelation present in the data set after socioeconomic predictors have been included in the 
equation. If significant, spatial or local contextual effects are considered operating in the area of 
study. 
We matched the 1994 elections data with 1995 socioeconomic data and the 2000 
elections with the 2000 census data as well. The resulting –non mathematical- equations were the 
following: 
1.  1994PAN = a + DV Spatial lag + 1995Income + 1995Education + 1995Housing conditions + 
Local Context + error 
                                                           
8 The electoral data analyzed in this work are available from the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) website.
8 The 
electoral data presented is the 1994 and 2000 presidential elections results. The socioeconomic data are Conteo 1995 
and Census 2000, and are also are available from the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics 
(INEGI) website in Mexico.   8 
2.  1994PRI = a + DV Spatial lag + 1995Income + 1995Education + 1995Housing conditions + Local 
Context + error 
3.  1994PRD = a + DV Spatial lag + 1995Income + 1995Education + 1995Housing conditions + 
Local Context + error 
4.  2000PAN = a + DV Spatial lag + 2000Income + 2000Education + 2000Housing conditions + 
Local Context + error 
5.  2000PRI = a + DV Spatial lag + 2000Income + 2000Education + 2000Housing conditions + Local 
Context + error 
6.  2000PRD = a + DV Spatial lag + 2000Income + 2000Education + 2000Housing conditions + 
Local Context + error 
 
3.  Measuring local context and class voting effects 
  Contextual differences in voting support were found for the PRI and the PRD within the 
MCMA (see Table 4). It is clear that the PAN was spatially homogeneous across the two 
contexts, FD and CA, for both elections. On the other hand, the PRI is the most spatially 




Table 4. Student´s t-test of differences in the percentage of the total vote for  
each party in FD and CA areas of the MCMA 
 1994  2000  ∆∆∆∆  1994 - 2000 
PAN  1.642 0.257 -0.816 
PRI  2.478** 8.387***  4.078*** 
PRD  -1.881*  -3.609***  -3.751*** 
Note: Negative values represent better voting performance in the FD versus the CA 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed test) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test) 
* Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed test) 
 
Spatial autocorrelation coefficients show patterns of concentration for all parties in both 
1994 and 2000 elections (see Table 5). Between the 1994 and 2000 elections, the coefficients 
notably increased in magnitude, meaning that geographical exclusion increased among the 
competing parties. This is the case especially for the PRI which evidences a fast geographical 
retrenchment towards the CA. The change in the vote for the PRI is also the most spatially 
concentrated.  
                                                           
9 Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests corroborated normal shape voting distributions for both 1994 and 2000 elections. Not 
included for document length reasons.   9 
Within this six year period, the PAN competed with the PRI for the CA while the PRD 
was the leading party in the FD. In addition, the change in the vote was spatially concentrated for 
all parties, which means higher changes happened in areas neighboring party strongholds. In this 
respect, the PRI vote was the most dependent on its strongholds. 
 
Table 5. Moran Spatial Autocorrelation Coefficients on voting results (DV) for each party 
in the 1994 and 2000 presidential elections in the MCMA 
 1994  2000  ∆ 1994-2000 
PAN  0.276*** 0.405*** 0.302*** 
PRI  0.233*** 0.503*** 0.435*** 
PRD  0.121* 0.446***  0.268*** 
Note: Calculated based on first-order neighborhood (contiguous units) 
* Significant at a .10 level (two-tailed test) 
*** Significant at a .01 level (two-tailed test) 
 
  Social class segregation can be spatially detected for 1995 and 2000 (see table 6). Yet 
noticeable are the major advances in drainage and electricity provision, making the MCMA a 
less spatially divided city in these respects. Still, coefficients show acute social segregation. The 
most spatially segregated are the more vs. less educated, and the less spatially segregated are the 
higher vs. lower incomes. 
 
Table 6. Moran Spatial Autocorrelation Coefficients on Social Class Predictors (IV) in 1995 
and 2000 in the MCMA 
 1995  2000 
Occupied population that earn > 10 daily minimum 
wages 
0.578*** 0.367*** 
Housing units with drainage and access to electricity  0.642*** 0.389*** 
Population aged > 15 yrs. with less than 6 years of 
school education 
0.531*** 0.511*** 
Note: Calculated based on first-order neighborhood (contiguous units) 
*** Significant at a .01 level (two-tailed test) 
 
 
Do preliminary evidences of local contextual effects on voting behavior hold after these 
geographical patterns of social class –the socioeconomic composition of each context- are 
considered altogether? The answer is affirmative but only for the PRD and the PAN (see table 7). 
 
For the PRD a positive local context effect was detectable in the FD area of the MCMA 
even after social class controls were included in the model. However, notice how contextual 
effects are smaller than income effects. On the other hand, the PRI shows no contextual effects at   10 
all. The PRI showed to be a “class voting” and “class politics” kind of party. This is in 
connection to Ward’s (1990) and Davis’ (1994) annotations. Finally, the PAN showed to be the 
opposite of PRI. In other words, the PAN did not benefit from any class effects, just local 
context.  
 
Table 7. Spatial lag regression results for PAN, PRI and PRD  
voting results (1994)**** 
  PAN PRI PRD 
Constant 0.285  0.054  0.649*** 
Social Class Effects:      
% of occupied population that earn > 10 daily 
minimum wages 
0.079 0.476*  -0.493 
% of housing units with drainage and access to 
electricity 
0.018 0.241*  -0.385** 
% of population aged > 15 yrs. with less than 6 
years of school education 
-0.543 1.304*** -0.428 
Local Contextual Effects:       
Spatial lag (Rho)
 a  0.077  0.037  -0.013 
Zone (FD or CA)
 b 0.039*  0.021  -0.068*** 
Model Diagnostics:       
Residual Standard Error  0.047  0.039  0.053 
Moran I Test on Residuals  -0.014  0.014  -0.002 
**** Calculated based on first-order neighborhood (contiguous units). Unstandardized coefficients (n = 56)  
a It refers to the spatially lagged DV
 
b Dummy variable: CA refers to the conurbated area and FD refers to the federal district. Negative values represent a 
better performance in the FD versus the CA 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed test) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test) 
* Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed test) 
 
The best adjusted model was the PRI’s. No model for any party presented problems of 
spatially autocorrelated residuals, meaning that the spatial lag and social class predictors were 
sufficient to wash away the spatial autocorrelation present in the DV (see Table 5). In other 
words, voting results and social class clusters matched spatially for PRD and PRI, which 
provides evidence to support McAllister and Studlar’s (1987) contention that the social 
composition of places matter more than the local political or economic context. 
For the 2000 elections the story is not too different yet some interesting aspects arise (see 
table 8). First, in this election all parties were dependent on class and local context. In this case, 
the PAN performed better in higher income areas and still performed better in the CA. However, 
notice that the magnitude of the CA effect is similar to the 1994 elections. The losing PRI did 
better among the less educated and in the CA or suburbs as well. In fact the PRI was expelled of   11 
the FD by the PRD. Finally, the PRD did much better in the lower income areas of the MCMA 
and twice better than the other two parties in the FD. The PAN showed to be somewhat more 
dependent on income than the PRD. However the PRD depended more than any other on the 
local context of the FD. In sum, the local context of the voter was more important in 2000 than in 
1994.  
 
Table 8. Spatial lag regression results for PAN, PRI and PRD  
voting results (2000)**** 
  PAN PRI PRD 
Constant -0.364  0.663**  0.537 
Social Class Effects:      
% of occupied population that earn > 10 
daily minimum wages 
0.893* 0.065 -0.793* 
% of housing units with drainage and access 
to electricity 
0.805 -0.464 -0.254 
% of population aged > 15 yrs. with less 
than 6 years of school education 
-0.809 0.840**  0.084 
Local Contextual Effects:       
Spatial lag (Rho)
 a  0.079  0.037  0.093 
Zone (FD or CA)
 b 0.048*  0.043***  -0.080*** 
Model Diagnostics:       
Residual Standard Error  0.058  0.033  0.053 
Moran I Test on Residuals  -0.003  0.011  -0.023 
**** Calculated based on first-order neighborhood (contiguous units). Unstandardized coefficients  
(n = 56)  
a It refers to the spatially lagged DV
 
bDummy variable: CA refers to the conurbated area and FD refers to the federal district. Negative values represent a 
better performance in the FD versus the CA 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed test) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test) 
* Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed test) 
 
Once again the best adjusted model was for the PRI. The PAN and the PRD residual 
standard errors were very similar. As for the 1994 elections, no model for any party presented 
problems of spatially autocorrelated residuals, meaning that predictors were sufficient to wash 
away the spatial autocorrelation present in the DV. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
 
  This study shows empirical evidence of varying local contextual effects operating in 
conjunction with varying social class components to determine electoral results in Mexico City’s 
metropolitan area. Naturally it might be quickly countered that contextual effects detected in this   12 
study are due to the lack of all and precise class voting indicators. This might be possible, yet 
statistically unlikely. A number of OLS regression models were tested with more than 20 social 
class variables and combinations -under the condition of incorporating income, education, and 
housing conditions altogether-, and no combination of class variables was found to leave the 
contextual effect FD/CA without its statistical significance.
10 
In this respect why is the FD electorate different from the CA electorate on the average? 
Academic literature has recorded that FD has been a refuge for non-PRI parties since the 1960s 
(Peschard, 1988a; Davis and Coleman, 1982). In fact, a tendency towards a vote of protest 
against the PRI is argued to have been present since the mid 1950s (Davis and Coleman, 1982). 
Also, as already advanced by Peschard (1997; 1988b; 1985), political reform and its effect on the 
development of a new political culture seem to have been an important factor for voting results 
in the MCMA. We agree with Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) in that past political conflicts help 
create new political values; therefore, new electoral preferences have been created in the 
MCMA. Besides, the decay of the PRI was already happening in the early 1990’s nationwide 
(Vilalta, 2004).  
And why is it that the CA or suburban voters have tended to prefer the PAN over the 
PRD? First consider that the PRD has been governing the FD since 1997, and this is a city with a 
history of left-wing political preferences. Second, it is argued that the MCMA electorate 
preferred the PAN candidate for the 2000 elections, Vicente Fox, since he was more charismatic 
than the PRD candidate, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, and more likely to win. Third, the PAN did not 
just capitalize on social class. It also attracted a considerable number of voters in both the FD 
and the CA areas. Spatial statistics show that the PAN was the most spatially concentrated party 
in the 1994 elections and the least spatially concentrated in the 2000 elections. The PAN 
presidential candidate won the MCMA due to its lowest levels of FD/CA spatial dependence and 
its more popular candidate Vicente Fox. On the other hand, the PRD attracted class voters 
mainly from the FD after its successful attempt to substitute the PRI class politics and clientelism 
practices. This strategy worked well for the local but not for presidential elections; it worked so 
well that it seems to be still bringing good results for the PRD (Vilalta, 2007). Inevitably, the 
                                                           
10  Combinations made for the 2000 voting results DV; data are available at authors´ websites for replication 
purposes.   13 
PRD relied heavily on an inner-metro and class discourse; and, consequently the PRD did not 
have all the electorate necessary to win in 2000. 
This study also shows that the PRI attracts class voters and it seems to have become 
dependent on the local context (Vilalta, 2004). For the 2000 elections it was similarly dependent 
as the PAN was on the CA vote. The PRI became spatially concentrated in the poorly urbanized 
east-side and the semi-rural west-side peripheral areas of the city. In these areas of the city the 
electoral machines of the PAN and the PRD are not as old and strong as the PRI’s. In this 
respect, many have argued that this abrupt decay of the PRI was fueled by the economic 
recession of 1995 and the generalized anger with structural corruption (Blum, 1997; Lawson, 
1997). In 1994 the economy was working well and the public opinion of the PRI president, 
Carlos Salinas, was somewhat acceptable; one year later, Mexico lost almost 7% of its GDP, and 
the PRI support in the capital rapidly disintegrated. 
To come to the point candidly, class voting had to be a useful explanatory device since 
MCMA is a city of rich entrepreneurs and poor workers, while heated class discourse and 
political confrontation coexist (Vilalta, 2007). Nevertheless, voting decisions in 1994 and 2000 
elections were not only class based. Electoral results coincided in 2000 with spatial patterns of 
social segregation, the local history of vote of protest, and the generalized a-spatial desire to 
change the PRI political regime. Social class and local context are both useful theoretical angles 
to understand voting results, though in varying degrees and from one election to another. Future 
academic debate will probably focus on to how to better conceptualize and understand local 
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